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Graham Priest profesor je filozofije na City University of New York i 
profesor emeritus na University of Melbourne. U svom radu bavi se 




What problems/topics initially got you interested in the field 
of logic? 
Well, my undergraduate degree was mainly in mathematics. Of the 
bits of mathematics I studied, I found those concerning the 
foundations of mathematics most interesting (perhaps because they 
are the most philosophical). Hence, I was led to an interest in issues 
in which logic plays an essential role: set theory, paradoxes of self-
reference, intuitionism. 
 
What problems/topics still have a grip on you even after all 
these years (are there any such)? 
All of them. I have acquired many new interests in my philosophical 
journey through life, but I have never lost an interest in any. 
 
How do you motivate your students for the study of logic 
(given that it isn’t the most popular subject in philosophy 
departments and their appeal)?  
Well, some students are fascinated by technical problems, in the 
same way that some people are fascinated by world problems. One 
doesn’t have to do much there. For students not of this  kind, it often 
works to show how the issues are not mere technical matters, but 
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that they sink deep into philosophical questions.  I tried to do 
something like this in my Logic: a Very Short Introduction.  
 
Would you say that today’s logician is more of a philosopher 
or a mathematician? Is it even possible for non-
mathematicians to meaningfully participate in current 
community of mathematical logicians? 
Logic is studied in philosophy departments, mathematics 
departments, computer science departments, and some linguistic 
departments. Typically, the interests of the people in the different 
departments will be somewhat different. There is a certain core of 
logical knowledge that all will need to know; but beyond that needs 
and problems are likely to be highly discipline-specific. Logic is still, 
however, an integral part of philosophy. 
 
What would you say that are still open and fruitful questions 
in logic? Do you expect any breakthroughs in the 21st 
century? 
Well, those who work in logic in the different disciplines would 
probably give different answers to the first question.  I don’t know 
enough about what goes on in logic in disciplines other than 
philosophy, so I cannot answer for these. As for philosophy, most of 
the exiting development over the last 40 years or so have been in 
non-classical logics. Some of these systems are now well understood; 
some still need a lot more work. There are also, clearly, many more 
systems still to be discovered and explored. Then, of course, there is 
the question of the possible applications of such systems.  Again, 
many are well known, and many need much further investigation.  I 
am sure that much will be learned about all these matters in the 
21st century. I’m not sure what a breakthrough is supposed to be. I 
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guess something really fundamental.  With there be such things? 
Who knows?  These things cannot be predicated. 
 
Kant (in)famously held that logic was completed science that 
cannot make a step forwards or backwards from the state 
Aristotle confined her in. Last century and a half witnessed 
previously unimaginable proliferation in plethora of 
different non-classical logical systems – do you believe there 
will ever again be such a unification (supposing there was 
ever one) and exhaustion of new possibilities in a grand 
general theory of logic?  
Kant didn’t know much about the history of logic.  Many new 
important theories and techniques were discovered in Western 
Medieval logic. The truth is that the history of logic, from Ancient 
Greece onwards, has always been one of competing theories and 
ideas. What has happened in the last 100 years is pretty spectacular 
in that regard, but it is different from other periods in the history of 
logic only in degree, not in kind. 
 
When did you start to waver away from the orthodoxy of 
classical logic? 
Well, my doctorate (1974) was on classical mathematical logic. 
During this time, and pretty much independently, I was worrying 
about philosophical issues in the foundations of mathematics, 
turning round the significance of  Goedel’s incompleteness theorem. 
I came to the conclusion that one needed to face the possibility of 
inconsistency in mathematics. If this is so, one clearly needs a 
paraconsistent logic. In the year after my doctorate I invented 
(discovered) LP for this end. 
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Was your development of the LP system motivated by some 
metaphysical concerns or was the influence the other way 
around – i.e. mathematical possibility ignited a philosophical 
curiosity?  
No, it was motivated by concerns in the philosophy of mathematics, 
and how, in particular, it could be the case that we are able to 
establish the truth of some things which cannot be proved in, say, 
Peano Arithmetic, by means that are, in some sense, clearly implicit 
in Peano Arithmetic itself. 
 
9. How did you come to advocate (from a traditional point of 
view) such an outrageous idea as dialetheism?  
By following argument where it seemed to lead. 
 
Do you think paraconsistent, or even dialethist accounts of 
truth and reasoning will ever become the dominant paradigm 
in theories of logic, truth and rationality? 
I have no idea. What I do think is that after some two and a half 
thousand years, the genie of inconsistency is finally out of the bottle, 
and it is not going to go back in quietly. 
 
Given that you’re a monist about logic, how do you see the 
pluralist positions on paraconsistency propounded by Greg 
Restall and J. C. Beall? 
Logical pluralism is currently a hot topic in the philosophy of logic.  
The book by Beall and Restall certainly put it on the map, but there 
are many other forms, some much older that theirs. And I find some 
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of these other forms much more plausible than that of Beall and 
Restall. I don’t think this is the place to go into all this. The details of 
my views can be found in chapter 12 of  Doubt Truth to be a Liar. 
 
Do you deem classical logic to be misguided in some aspects 
additional to the so called paradoxes of material implication 
and its principle of bivalence? 
Well, I think those are the main ones. But rectifying them takes us 
into territory a long way beyond anything on the classical horizon. 
 
Do you think that correctness or incorrectness of dialetheic 
position concerns something more than semantic anomalies, 
that is, only logic from the theoretical perspective, with its 
concerns with details and nuances irrelevant for other 
scientific, or non-scientific endeavors? 
No, I think that the importance of dialetheism is not merely about 
the paradoxes of self-reference (if I understand the question 
correctly). I think it can be used to shed light on matters of 
metaphysics, law and morality, phenomenology, and perhaps even 
in science itself. At present there are no accepted scientific theories 
according to which physical reality is contradictory; but once 
people’s eyes are opened to the possibility of this, I do not see why 
there could not be. We now know that there are various 
paraconsistent pure mathematical theories (of algebra, topology, 
and so on). Scientist swill help themselves to whatever bits of 
mathematics seem to do the required job. It is not beyond the 
bounds of possibility that at some future stage, scientists might 
come to hold that a piece of paraconsistent mathematics is just 
what is required. In such a case, we might well be led to the view 
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that physical reality, perhaps “below the observable level”, is itself 
contradictory. 
 
How broad are the boundaries of the set of legitimate 
dialetheias? Can they be formally enumerated on grounds of 
some principles explaining their behavior or they are to be 
individually hunted down and empirically validated?   
No, I don’t think that there is any a priori way of putting a bound on 
the range of possible dialetheias.  It is impossible to tell, in advance, 
where rational inquiry may lead us. 
 
Do you think that dialetheias you accept as real are 
dependent on your background metaphysical assumptions, 
or perhaps practical, psychological, or other such extra-
logical motives and reasons? 
Doubtless what views people actually do accept is determined by all 
kinds of factors, both objective and subjective. However, rational 
acceptability is, presumably, determined by purely objective factors. 
It is the evidence which counts. I don’t think that the rational 
acceptability of dialetheias is any different in this regard from the 
rational acceptability of anything else. 
 
Can there ever be a logical system fully independent from 
ontological presuppositions and commitments? 
No, all logical systems have metaphysical assumptions built into 





What are some of the more intuitive applications of the 
paraconsistent calculi to everyday or specialized reasoning? 
Well, there are important applications of paraconsistent logic for 
information processing systems. Such systems may well not just 
store and search data; they may make inferences from them. But 
data bases are often corrupt, due to input errors, multiple sources, 
etc, and so may end up inconsistent. And as is well known, there is 
no algorithm which will, in general, determine whether information 
is inconsistent. To draw information from an inconsistent data base 
using an explosive logic, is obviously not sensible. So a 
paraconsistent logic is required.  More contentiously, nearly all our 
practical reasoning employs vague terms. And such terms are 
subject to sorites paradoxes, which allow one to infer  conclusions 
that are manifestly incorrect, such as that a person of 83 is a child, 
since they were a child at age 1, and if they are a child at any age, 
they are a child one second later. Solutions to the sorites pardox are 
contentions, but a number of logicians now subscribe to a 
paraconsistent solution. Such reasoning breaks down because it 
makes consistency assumptions along the route. Finally, there is, as I 
mentioned, paraconsistent mathematics, which may in due course, 
find applications in science. 
 
You engaged in reading, from a standard analytical 
perspective, some infamous philosophical figures like G. W. F. 
Hegel. What did you learn from studying him? How do you see 
the relationship between contemporary core analytical 
philosophy (logic, philosophy of science, language and 
epistemology) and recently emerged scholarship of Hegel, 
and other “continental” philosophers? Which other similar 
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historical thinkers inspire you? How do your peers respond 
to your valorization of such thinkers? 
I think that Hegel’s overall system of global idealism, driven by Geist, 
is crazy. However, as in the case of all great philosophers there is 
much to be learned from the insights he has on particular issues. For 
example, I think that Hegel is really on to something with his theory 
of motion. Of course, perhaps the most important thing for me is 
that Hegel is a clear dialetheist: the most important such between 
Aristotle and the present day.  Naturally, many interpreters of Hegel 
have been scared off by the thought that their hero might violate the 
Principle of Non-Contradiction. One thing that they can learn from 
modern logic is that there is nothing to be scared of.  Other 
“continental” philosophers: I don’t see an important distinction 
between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy. Both are very 
often concerned with the same issues, and even have similar views.  
There are differences of styles and expression; but the history of 
philosophy shows that there are many of those. And of course there 
are good and bad philosophers on both sides of the so called divide.  
Anyone can learn from good philosophers, whatever tradition they 
come from (analytic or continental, Eastern or Western).  The 
analytic/continental divide does not really exist before the 20th 
century. Which are the most interesting/important continental 
philosophers since then?  Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Sartre, 
Foucault (if he is a philosopher). How do my peers respond to my 
work? I have many peers in many traditions of philosophy.  Many of 
them are as interested in breaking down out-dated boundaries as I 
am. And those who are not, can just take anything they find to be of 
value in my work, and leave the rest. 
 
What got you interested in the debate on logic of catuskoti? In 
the last one hundred years that western scholars started to 
explore and appreciate that formal aspect of madhyamika 
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(and early buddhist) thought, there weren’t more than thirty 
people involved in efforts of tackling that problem. How do 
you feel about participating in such obscure, so to say “elite” 
club? 
I got interested in the philosophy of the Asian traditions in the mid-
1990s when I met someone who knew something about them for the 
first time: Jay Garfield. Talking to Jay made me realise that there 
were large parts of philosophy I knew nothing about. I determined 
to learn. At first what interested me were the various systems of 
metaphysics, especially, though not exclusively, that of Madhyamaka 
Buddhism.  It was somewhat later that I realised that the techniques 
of contemporary non-classical logic could be applied sometimes. My 
work on the catuṣkoṭi is one aspect of this. (My work on Jaina 
metaphysics in another.)  Buddhist philosophy has been studied 
intensively by Western scholars, though it is only recently that 
Western philosophers (as opposed to those working in departments 
of philology, Asian studies, and  comparative religion) have turned 
their attention to such matters. The number is still small, but 
growing rapidly.  Very few of these philosophers are professional 
logicians, in the way that I am. So I can bring to the investigation 
something that they cannot.   I cannot bring the scholarship and 
language skills that most of them can bring; but a collaborative 
investigation, of the kind I often now take part in, with a bunch of 
people with different skills and abilities, can be very rewarding. How 
do I feel about all this? Very happy. 
 
Do you think your engagement with catuskoti reached its end 
with your last book “The fifth corner of four”?  
Who knows? Probably not. 
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What are your plans for future work in philosophy or logic? 
I’ve always just done what engaged my interest next. Since my 
interests are many, I’m always working on a multitude of things. 
And where this can lead is a bit unpredictable.  At present, the major 
book project is one on social philosophy. I want to bring together 
Marxist and Buddhist thought.  As I write this, I am in Turin, 
teaching a course on the logic and metaphysics of nothingness. 
Perhaps that will result in a book too. 
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